The Thirteenth Amendment says no one (person) shall be enslaved but upon Conviction of a Crime. Year after year arrest, prosecutions and convictions are gained by crooked prosecutors in conjunction with corrupt crooked law enforcement officials submitting false allegations on warrant applications which are given enforcement on the basis of Judges making probable cause findings off the false statements in warrant applications. When false information is submitted to a judge and that judge finds probable cause, that does not mean that probable cause exist, what is does mean is the judge made a decision based on misrepresentations and that said decision was not independently made. The conduct of producing false warrants is a type of Securities Fraud because Warrants are legally and commercially defined as Securities. Twelve Years a Slave shows us the labor of slavery, it omits the financial system — asset securitization — that made slavery possible and still plagues us today. Both era’s Old Fashion Jim Crow and New Jim Crow were into securitization. Securitization is necessary for a Slave System to function.
In the antebellum period, the assets were slaves themselves. In our period the Criminal Defendant becomes as asset one a Judge makes a probable cause determination upon a warrant. Mortgages on slaves were issued and put in pools which were securitized and sold to European Christian Colonist, Slavers, Traffickers, etc. The same thing is occurring with warrants as they are used in the Judiciary of our Criminal Justice System. I have seen it first hand. In State v. Wehling the Officer lied about criminal complaint warrant applications that only she signed. No one else signed the documents, during the Internal Affairs Interview she lied about the documents and stated that they had been signed by a Judge. The case against me was dismissed at this time, however the I.A. Detective and the Special Deputy Attorney General both knew that Wehling was lying because I forwarded them a copy of the warrant papers before the interview took place. Instead of these officials doing their duty and moving forward with prosecuting they in turn administratively dismissed the matter for lack of insufficient evidence. Of course this all occurs after I was convicted, forced to pay a fine, had that conviction reversed, probable cause findings made against the officer for Human Trafficking, Civil Rights, False Reports, False Swearing and Peonage, and the matter was dismissed in my favor and is now before the NJ Supreme Court and the U.S. District Court of New Jersey.
During the Plantation era, the Planters’ mortgage payments paid the interest and the principle on these bond payments. Enslaved human beings had been, in modern financial lingo, “securitized.” As slave-backed mortgages became paper bonds, everybody profited — except, obviously, enslaved African Americans whose forced labor repaid owners’ mortgages. See American finance grew on the back of slaves
In our era the warrants are on an equal footing with mortgages because both instruments constituted “Securities”, when a Search Warrant is issued for an individuals home it must include information that may be found in a mortgage.
Baptist wrote “Slave-backed bonds “generated revenue for investors from enslavers’ repayments of mortgages on enslaved people,” he also said they were “remarkably similar to the securitized bonds, backed by mortgages on US homes, that attracted investors from around the globe to US financial markets from the 1980s until the economic collapse of 2008.” See 5 Things About Slavery You Probably Didn’t Learn In Social Studies: A Short Guide To ‘The Half Has Never Been Told’
When an individual is found guilty whether by Jury or Plea Agreement that individual is subjected to fines, funds from the fines are declared as going towards Trust. Instead of being warehoused on a plantation you are warehoused in a county jail or prison which is funded by the State and the same Federal Government that says no one shall be enslaved but upon conviction of a crime. The interesting part about all of this is the reaction the current descendants of African slaves have here in the United States, it is clear to me now more than every that because the Education system does not educate those descendants on the Badges, Incidents and Vestiges of Slavery, when they are subjected to these conditions they do not recognize them as such, this is why a majority of inmates do not realize that they are legally slaves under the Thirteenth Amendment, which is a double edge sword as it prohibits the badges, incidents and vestiges of slavery but one problem is that most of the people vulnerable to the lingering vestiges of slavery have no idea what constitutes a badge, incident and vestiges of Slavery.
A New Study Predicts Wrongful Conviction Rate in U.S. at 5,000 to 10,000 Per Year Plea bargaining in the United States is very common; the vast majority of criminal cases in the United States are settled by plea bargain rather than by a jury trial. They have also been increasing in frequency—they rose from 84% of federal cases in 1984 to 94% by 2001. A rise in the scale and scope of criminal law led to plea bargaining’s gaining new acceptance in the early 20th century, as courts and prosecutors sought to address an overwhelming influx of cases: See Plea bargaining in the United States
Thus Men and Women perceived to be Black have been Securitized again in this generation, this time not by private individuals directly but private individuals employed by Government and acting under color of Law such as Police Officers, Prosecutors and Judges, the same scheme that operated under Old Fashioned Jim Crow and outright Slavery.
Warrants are defined under Federal and State Law as “Securities”.
18 U.S. Code § 513 (C) (3) (A) defines the term “security” means—warrant;
New Jersey Statutes – Title 49 Sale of Securities – 49:3-49 Definitions relative to Uniform Securities Law. (m) “Security” means in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a “security,” or warrant or right to subscribe to
New Jersey Statues Title 49:4-1. Security; governing instrument defined As used in this act: a. “Security” and “securities” includes (1) all other instruments and writings, however designated, evidencing an obligation to pay money
Because those claims form “part of the same case or controversy as Relator’s securities fraud claim, the district court has, at the very least, supplemental jurisdiction over those claims. 28 U.S.C. §1367(a); see Murphy v. Fla. Keys Elec. Co-op. Ass’n, Inc., 329 F.3d1311, 1319(11thCir. 2003).
Citing the U.S. Supreme Court in Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103 (1990), “Our conclusion that “falsely made” encompasses genuine documents containing false information is supported by Congress’ purpose in enacting 2314…
Our prior decisions have recognized Congress’ “general intent and “broad purpose” to curb the type of trafficking in fraudulent securities that often depends for its success on the exploitation of interstate commerce. In United States v. Sheridan, 329 U.S. 379, 67 S.Ct. 332, 91 L.Ed. 359 (1946)
Police officers acting pursuant to a facially valid warrant generally are deemed to have probable cause to arrest. See Kis v. County of Schuylkill, 866 F.Supp. 1462, 1469 (E.D.Pa.1994).
This does not mean, of course, that an officer may arrest an individual whom he knows it not the subject of the warrant or indefinitely detain an arrestee without attempting to resolve an apparent issue of identity. See Kennell, 215 F.3d at 829-30.
An arrest based on an outstanding warrant that was discovered only as a result of the warrantless search, would be unconstitutional. United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit. Raahkiim EL BEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Tim ROOP, Matt Miller, Darrin Barlow, Diane L. Bryan, and William F. Schenck, Defendants – Appellees. No. 07-3133.– July 01, 2008
The prohibition against a law enforcement officer issuing a warrant, as distinguished from a summons, is in accordance with theCourt’s holding in State v. Ruotolo, 52 N.J., 508 (1968). And see Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has suggested that improper behavior of police officers, such as false arrests and false testimony, can deprive persons of “Equal Benefit” of the law and of “like punishment.” See David Crane, Smantha Crane, Plaintiffs vs. Cumberland County, PA, et al., Defendants Civil Action No. 1:CV-99-1798 United States District Court For The Middle District Of Pennsylvania 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22489 June 16, 2000, Decided June 16, 2000, Filed.
“[A]n arrest warrant issued by a magistrate or judge does not, in itself, shelter an officer from liability for false arrest.” Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 786 (3d Cir. 2000).
An individual officer who did not effectuate the arrest can be liable under Section 1983 for obtaining a warrant through material false statements that result in a constitutional deprivation. Lippay v. Christos, 996 F.2d 1490, 1502 (3d Cir. 1993).
“The Fourth Amendment places restrictions and qualifications on the actions of the government generally, not merely on affiants.” United States v. DeLeon, 979 F.2d 761, 764 (9th Cir. 1992).
“A governmental official violates the Fourth Amendment when he deliberately or recklessly provides false, material information for use in an affidavit in support of a search warrant, regardless of whether he signs the affidavit.” Hart v. O’Brien, 127 F.3d 424, 448-49 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding against a county attorney who did not sign the affidavit, but “was the exclusive source of the inaccurate information” could be liable under Section 1983); see also United States v. Pritchard, 745 F.2d 1112, 1118 (7th Cir. 1984)
(“[W]hile allegations that an informant, whose story was recited by an affiant, was lying are insufficient to require a Franks hearing, this principle does not apply when one government agent deliberately or recklessly misrepresents information to a second agent, who then innocently includes the misrepresentations in an affidavit.”). “As the Supreme Court noted in Franks, ‘police [can] not insulate one officer’s deliberate misstatement merely by relaying it through an officer-affiant personally ignorant of its falsity.’” United States v. Calisto, 838 F.2d 711, 714 (3d Cir. 1988) (quoting Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S.154, 164 n.6 (1978)). The affidavit of probable cause in Calisto stated an informant provided information to Officer Gilbride who relayed it to the affiant. Id. But Gilbride concealed the fact that he obtained the information from a Pennsylvania Crime Commission officer, who obtained it from another officer who was in contact with the informant. Id. (noting the police concealed the identity of the informant and the officer who was in contact with him to protect their source). The Third Circuit held that Gilbride could be responsible for intentionally omitting the sources of his information when relaying it to the affiant this information.