The question remains whether Plaintiff’s allegation of a single failure by the Clearwater Police Department to investigate his claim is a sufficient factual basis to allege an official policy or custom. In its motion to dismiss, the City of Clearwater suggests that Plaintiff must specifically show other instances in which this policy has been applied. Since the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 106 S. Ct. 1292, 89 L. Ed. 2d 452 (1986), this question is settled. A single action by an individual with policymaking authority may constitute official policy for the purposes of finding municipal liability under § 1983. See Mandel v. Doe, 888 F.2d 783, 791 (11th Cir.1989), where the Eleventh Circuit noted that “there may be many ways of proving the existence of a municipal policy or custom that can cause a deprivation of a constitutional right” (quoting City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 834, 105 S. Ct. 2427, 2441, 85 L. Ed. 2d 791 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
As Justice Brennan noted in Tuttle, “A § 1983 cause of action is as available for the first victim of a policy or custom that would foreseeably and avoidably cause an individual to be subjected to deprivation of a constitutional right as it is for the second and subsequent victims.” Id. at 831, 105 S. Ct. at 2439 (quoted in Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1504 (11th Cir.1990)). We note that Plaintiff has not named a policymaker who is responsible for the decision not to investigate his claim or to pursue his prosecution. However, naming the individual policymaker and suing him in his official capacity is the equivalent of suing the City itself, which Plaintiff has done. See Farred v. Hicks,915 F.2d 1530, 1532 (11th Cir.1990).
Plaintiff may be required later to document specific other instances in order to prove that a custom or policy exists. A custom that is so permanent and well settled as to have the force of law can equate to an official policy, particularly where policymakers knew or should have known of the practice and the danger that it would lead to the violation of constitutional rights. Plaintiff will be required to show that the policymaker had specific knowledge of the practice, and approved, ratified or acquiesced in it, or was deliberately indifferent to the potential violation of citizens’ rights that could result from such a practice. Whether discovery into Plaintiff’s claim shows that his rights were violated as a result of a single policymaker or a settled and persistent practice, it would be premature for this Court to assume that one or the other cannot be proven. Accordingly, this Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations of a policy are sufficient to withstand a 12(b) (6) motion for dismissal. Taken as true, the allegations state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
Defendant City of Clearwater has cited a variety of cases to support its motion to dismiss this claim. The decisions are from other districts, and largely pre-date Pembaur and its progeny. In Cummings v. Palm Beach County, 642 F. Supp. 248 (S.D.Fla.1986) andGutierrez v. City of Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. 1494 (S.D.Fla.1989), the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida found that vague and conclusory allegations of age and race discrimination *598 did not comply with the “fair notice” requirement of pleading, and did not enable a defendant to focus on the violative acts, customs, practices or policies in question. This Court finds that this case is distinguishable from both Cummings and Gutierrez.
In Gutierrez, the plaintiffs attempted to hold the city liable for an isolated shooting by a police officer, and made conclusory allegations that the city had a policy and custom of permitting officers to use excessive force in the apprehension of suspects. The only incident alleged was the shooting in question. The court in Gutierrez, quoting the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 105 S. Ct. 2427, found that a plaintiff must allege more than merely an isolated or single act of an unconstitutional deprivation to establish a custom or policy. The court noted that a municipality cannot be held liable on a theory of respondeat superior.
The case at bar is distinguishable, because the alleged policy does not focus solely on the actions of the individual officer. When Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Internal Affairs Division of the City of Clearwater, his claim expanded beyond the actions of a single officer, and presumably reached the attention of someone with policymaking power to decide how to proceed on the complaint.
The Court in Tuttle specifically noted that under Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978), a single incident of unconstitutional activity might be sufficient to impose liability if the incident was caused by an existing, unconstitutional municipal policy attributable to a municipal policymaker. Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 823-24, 105 S. Ct. at 2435-36. This position of the U.S. Supreme Court was echoed in Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 106 S. Ct. 1292, 89 L. Ed. 2d 452 (1986) and refined in City of St. Louis v. Prapotnick, 485 U.S. 112, 108 S. Ct. 915, 99 L. Ed. 2d 107 (1988) (decisions of lower level employees who have not been delegated policymaking responsibility are not “policy”).
In the other case from Southern District court cited by Defendants, Cummings, the court found that the complaint in that case would even have failed the liberal Conley test for pleading. Cummings, 642 F. Supp. at 250. The complaint was vague and conclusory and failed to state any facts upon which to base the claims of age and race discrimination. Nor, found the court, could an inference of racial discrimination be drawn from the actions in the pleadings. By contrast, Plaintiff in this case has clearly alleged that certain actions of Defendants were motivated by racial animus. In particular, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Carrasquillo’s demeanor and his treatment of the Plaintiff as a “second class” citizen exhibited his racial animus against Plaintiff, and that the City’s failure to investigate officer misconduct was due to its custom of ignoring such complaints by blacks and other minorities. When taken as true, the allegations of a policy that singles out and ignores the complaints against officers made by black citizens states a claim sufficient to survive a 12(b) (6) motion to dismiss.
Defendant City of Clearwater also cited Davis v. Frapolly, 717 F. Supp. 614 (N.D.Ill.1989), in which plaintiff’s complaint contained no allegations of discriminatory intent and no facts from which the court could draw an inference that the officer’s actions were motivated by the arrestee’s race. As noted above, in the case at bar such allegations were made. Defendant’s memorandum also relies uponSanders v. City of New York, 692 F. Supp. 308 (S.D.N.Y.1988), which dismissed a plaintiff’s count alleging the city was deliberately indifferent to the constitutional rights of persons because it had set up a Civilian Complaint Review Board to entertain complaints against police officers, but failed to adequately investigate the plaintiff’s complaint.
The court found that the complaint lacked specific allegations of fact indicating a deprivation of rights under this count, as required by the heightened civil rights pleading rule. In the case before this Court, however, Plaintiff has alleged that no investigation of his complaint occurred. Specific facts regarding the adequacy of the investigation would be irrelevant and *599 impossible to produce. Assuming Plaintiff’s allegations to be true, the complaint against the City of Clearwater states a claim, unlike the complaint in Sanders.
In order to ultimately prevail on this claim against the City of Clearwater, Plaintiff must identify a policymaker, so designated by state law or by a custom having the force of law, who decided to ignore Plaintiff’s complaint for racial reasons, or who has been deliberately indifferent to a practice evidenced by repeated instances of ignoring such complaints. In addition, Plaintiff must establish a causal link to show that the policy was the moving force behind the individual officer’s deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights.