Former prosecutor and city public defender Harold W. George was appointed to a Municipal Judge in the City of Trenton, New Jersey in 2008. George is a longtime resident of Trenton and has worked there as a public defender and as general counsel to the Trenton Housing Authority for nearly a decade before taking the Municipal Bench. George also worked as a labor counsel, an executive secretary of the New Jersey Local Finance Board, and served as a deputy state attorney general. George earned his juris doctor degree in 1988 from the Rutgers-Camden School of Law and a bachelor’s degree in political science from North Carolina A & T State University in 1982.
He was admitted to both the New Jersey and Pennsylvania bar in 1988. George was one of the Municipal Judges booted from the Bench in the City of Trenton by Mayor Eric Jackson. George was recently reinstated to the Municipal Bench in Trenton and has remained on the Bench in Willingboro since first hired. The Following tickets extend from 2009 to 2016.7:2-1. Contents of Complaint, Arrest Warrant and Summons (a) Complaint: General. The complaint shall be a written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged made on a form approved by the Administrative Director of the Courts. Except as otherwise provided by paragraphs (f) (Traffic Offenses), (g) (Special Form of Complaint and Summons), and (h) (Use of Special Form of Complaint and Summons in Penalty Enforcement Proceedings), the complaining witness shall attest to the facts contained in the complaint by signing a certification or signing an oath before a judge or other person so authorized by N.J.S.A. 2B:12-21.
If the complaining witness is a law enforcement officer, the complaint may be signed by an electronic entry secured by a Personal Identification Number (hereinafter referred to as an electronic signature) on the certification, which shall be equivalent to and have the same force and effect as an original signature. The Following Un-Sworn Special Form of Complaint and Summons forms were allowed by Harold W. George presiding over the Willingboro Municipal Court to proceed in direct violation of Common law and Rule 7:2-1(a) of the Rules Governing the Courts of New Jersey. See Rule 7:2-1(a)
Typically, the person who abuses process is interested only in accomplishing some improper purpose that is collateral to the proper object of the process and that offends justice, such as an unjustified arrest or an unfounded criminal prosecution. Subpoenas to testify, attachments of property, executions on property, garnishments, and other provisional remedies are among the types of “process” considered to be capable of abuse.Thus several individuals were subjected to illegal summons, warrants and fines on basis of Harold W. George allowing un-sworn complaints to proceed, misrepresenting to assumed defendants that they were required to subject themselves to prosecution on the basis of Summons pendent on Un-Sworn Complaints to obtain payments from fines, state and federal funding in relation to gaining convictions and housing inmates on the basis of these un-sworn complaints.
PAGO LLC has conducted an audit of the Special Form of Complaint and Summons Tickets filed within the years 2009 to 2016 issued by NJ Willingboro police officers and processed by the Willingboro Nj Municipal Court in direct violation N.J. Ct. R. 7:2-1(a) under the Supervision of Municipal Judge Harold W. George and found that the Department and Municipal Court has been engaging as a matter of practice in the Common Law Tort known as Abuse of Process and essentially violating the Federal and State Constitutional Right to Due process and to be free from Badges of Slavery and the Enticement into Slavery. George is currently a defendant in El Mujaddid v. Township of Willingboro, et. al.,
There are two basic elements necessary to sustain the cause of action of abuse of process. They are (1) that the defendant made an improper, illegal and perverted use of the legal procedure, that is to say, his/her resort to the legal process was neither warranted nor authorized by law,1 and (2) that the defendant had an ulterior motive in initiating the legal process. In other words, abuse of process is the misuse or misapplication of the legal procedure in a manner not contemplated by law. Specifically, the plaintiff contends that the defendant utilized the legal process to intimidate, harass and coerce the plaintiff in order to obtain a collateral advantage. In other words, the plaintiff contends that the defendant invoked the legal process to accomplish some unlawful end, namely, to compel the plaintiff to do some collateral thing which he/she could not legally be compelled to do.In short, in order for the plaintiff to prevail in this action, he/she must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant made an improper, illegal, and perverted use of the process and that there existed an ulterior motive or purpose on part of the defendant. If you find that the use of the process was a proper one, then I charge you as a matter of law that the motive is immaterial.
The legal pursuits of one’s rights, no matter what may be the motive of the promoter of the action, cannot be deemed either illegal or inequitable. It is the misuse of the process, though properly obtained, which constitutes the misconduct for which liability is imposed.Abuse of process differs from malicious prosecution in that the gist of the tort is not commencing an action or causing process to issue without justification, but misusing, or misapplying process justified in itself for an end other than that which it was designed to accomplish. The purpose for which the process is used, once it is issued, is the only thing of importance. Consequently, in an action for abuse of process it is unnecessary for the plaintiff to prove that the proceeding has terminated in his favor, or that the process was obtained without probable cause or in the course of a proceeding begun without probable cause. It is often said that proof of ‘malice’ is required; but it seems well settled that, except on the issue of punitive damages, this does not mean spite or ill will, or anything other than the improper purpose itself for which The process is used, and that even a pure spite motive is not sufficient where process is used only to accomplish the result for which it was created. Thus if the defendant prosecutes an innocent plaintiff for a crime without reasonable grounds to believe him guilty, it is malicious prosecution; if he prosecutes him with such grounds to extort payment of a debt, it is abuse of process. See also Earl v. Winne, 14 N.J. 119, 135 (1953); 34 N.J. Super. 605, 616 (Cty. Ct. 1955).