Existing private statutory causes of action against certain criminal offenders similarly deny standing to parties who have not been injured by the alleged criminal violation. The private civil causes of action under the federal antitrust statutes and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982), allow parties to recover treble damages from violators of these statutes. These provisions are analogous to this Comment’s proposal in that they permit private parties the means to enforce criminal laws, and may result in the imposition of punishment beyond mere compensatory civil damages. Both statutes require the traditional “injury in fact” to establish standing in a private action. 15 U.S.C. § 15; 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982) (any person “injured in his business or property” by a violation of the antitrust laws or RICO, respectively, may sue therefore and recover treble damages and the costs of the suit). This Comment similarly adopts the injury-in-fact requirement. For a discussion of the victim’s standing to use this proposed procedure, see infra text accompanying notes 76-82
In the United States, a private right is one that a private citizen can vindicate in court. Compare public rights. There must be a private right for a citizen to have a claim. To have a private right of action, a citizen must be able to show that He/she has “sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury” and not that He/she “suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally.” Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923). a distinction between criminal rights and “private rights,” arguing that restrictions against ex post facto laws were not designed to protect citizens’ contract rights.
A private person in whose presence a felony committed has the right and the duty ti arrest felon without waiting for issuance of a warrant, and he may lawfully arrest without a warrant on fresh pursuit one whom he knows to have committed a felony. U.S. v. Strickland, W.D.S.C. 1945, 62 F. Supp. 468. A private person, who has reason to believe that a felony is being committed, may arrest without a warrant and may seize evidence of crime. U.S. v. Briddle, E.D. Pa. 1941, 39 F. Supp. 203. Although a private citizen except where the rule is changed by statute, has the right to arrest without a warrant one who commits a breach of the peace in his presence, such detention is only until a proper officer of the law is available. Lima v. Lawler, E.D. Va. 1945, 63 F. Supp. 446.
“The federal securities laws rely on three enforcement regimes. First, the government can file civil, criminal, or administrative proceedings against persons who have allegedly violated the federal securities laws. 1 Second, the federal securities laws provide for express remedies in favor of private parties who claim damages as a result of specific violations of the federal securities laws. 2 Third, the courts have created a series of implied rights of action that permit private parties to file suit under statutory provisions that, on their face, do not provide for actions for monetary damages. 3
These implied private rights of action, articulated in neither statute, legislative history, nor regulation, today fuel a firestorm of controversy and debate. In particular, the private right of action implied under Rule 10b-5 4 has become civil plaintiffs’ primary weapon in their battle against securities fraud. Plaintiffs in class action securities fraud cases have claimed billions of dollars of damages for violations of the implied Rule 10b-5 private right. Defendants in many Rule 10b-5 cases are up in arms over class action securities fraud claims that they assert are out of control. Meanwhile, private party plaintiffs staunchly defend their litigation tactics as efforts necessary to deter fraud and to compensate victims of alleged corporate wrongdoing.”
Copyright © 1994 The Harvard Law Review Association. Harvard Law Review ARTICLE: DISIMPLYING PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION UNDER THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS: THE COMMISSION’S AUTHORITY. MARCH, 1994 107 Harv. L. Rev. 963 Author Joseph A. Grundfest *
18 USC Chapter 77 – PEONAGE, SLAVERY, AND TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS18 USC § 1595 – Civil remedy
(a) An individual who is a victim of a violation of this chapter may bring a civil action against the perpetrator (or whoever knowingly benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value from participation in a venture which that person knew or should have known has engaged in an act in violation of this chapter) in an appropriate district court of the United States and may recover damages and reasonable attorneys fees.
(1) Any civil action filed under this section shall be stayed during the pendency of any criminal action arising out of the same occurrence in which the claimant is the victim.
(2) In this subsection, a “criminal action” includes investigation and prosecution and is pending until final adjudication in the trial court.
(c) No action may be maintained under this section unless it is commenced not later than 10 years after the cause of action arose
18 USC Chapter 96 – RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS18 USC § 1964 – Civil remedies
(a) The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of section 1962 of this chapter by issuing appropriate orders, including, but not limited to: ordering any person to divest himself of any interest, direct or indirect, in any enterprise; imposing reasonable restrictions on the future activities or investments of any person, including, but not limited to, prohibiting any person from engaging in the same type of endeavor as the enterprise engaged in, the activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce; or ordering dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise, making due provision for the rights of innocent persons.
(b) The Attorney General may institute proceedings under this section. Pending final determination thereof, the court may at any time enter such restraining orders or prohibitions, or take such other actions, including the acceptance of satisfactory performance bonds, as it shall deem proper.
(c) Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee, except that no person may rely upon any conduct that would have been actionable as fraud in the purchase or sale of securities to establish a violation of section 1962. The exception contained in the preceding sentence does not apply to an action against any person that is criminally convicted in connection with the fraud, in which case the statute of limitations shall start to run on the date on which the conviction becomes final.
(d) A final judgment or decree rendered in favor of the United States in any criminal proceeding brought by the United States under this chapter shall estop the defendant from denying the essential allegations of the criminal offense in any subsequent civil proceeding brought by the United States.
18 USC Chapter 113B – TERRORISM18 USC § 2333 – Civil remedies
(a) Action and Jurisdiction.— Any national of the United States injured in his or her person, property, or business by reason of an act of international terrorism, or his or her estate, survivors, or heirs, may sue therefor in any appropriate district court of the United States and shall recover threefold the damages he or she sustains and the cost of the suit, including attorney’s fees.
(b) Estoppel Under United States Law.— A final judgment or decree rendered in favor of the United States in any criminal proceeding under section 1116, 1201, 1203, or 2332 of this title or section 46314, 46502, 46505, or 46506 of title 49 shall estop the defendant from denying the essential allegations of the criminal offense in any subsequent civil proceeding under this section.
(c) Estoppel Under Foreign Law.— A final judgment or decree rendered in favor of any foreign state in any criminal proceeding shall, to the extent that such judgment or decree may be accorded full faith and credit under the law of the United States, estop the defendant from denying the essential allegations of the criminal offense in any subsequent civil proceeding under this section.