In Mullen v. Ippolito Corporation Plaintiffs similar to the movant here, also claimed that the municipal defendants ignored their repeated complaints. The Court found that the municipal defendants have not responded to plaintiffs’ repeated complaints seeking enforcement of the local ordinances. Applying these standards here, plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence that their complaints to the municipal zoning and construction code officials were intended to trigger some kind of response or formal investigation. Plaintiffs identified areas of concern with respect to the motel’s business activities and requested that corrective action be taken. Over the years, plaintiffs saw these alleged unlawful activities continue unabated, to the detriment of their right to the quiet enjoyment of their home. As a practical matter, plaintiffs were able to discover these alleged expansions only after they were completed. Their complaints to the municipal defendants thereafter met with either negligent indifference or willful disregard. Here, plaintiffs’ cause of action is grounded on the municipal defendants’ failure to respond to or act upon their numerous complaints of alleged zoning violations by the Driftwood. If true, these allegations describe an amorphous history of municipal inaction, rendering plaintiffs without a realistic alternative form of administrative relief. This is especially true with respect to the complaints involving the sand dunes. In a footnote to his certification Mullen indicated that he had made similar complaints to construction code enforcement officer Gardner and zoning enforcement officer Petrillo. Our Supreme Court has recognized that cases “involving: (1) important and novel constitutional questions; (2) informal or ex parte determinations of legal questions by administrative officials; and (3) important public rather than private interests which require adjudication or clarification” have satisfied the “interest of justice” standard in Rule 4:69–6(c). Borough of Princeton v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 169 N.J. 135, 152 (2001).
In Skillman v. Police Commissioners on application for mandamus Before Justices DIXON, GUMMERE AND LUDLOW. For the mandamus, John M. Dickinson and Edwin Robert Walker. Contra, George W. Macpherson and John H. Backes. The opinion of the court was delivered by Dixon, J. In February, 1899, the Relator, a resident of Trenton, presented to the board of police commissioners of that city a complaint charging that one of the policemen of the city had illegally arrested him and made false accusations against him before the police magistrate, and thereupon he prayed that the policeman might be disciplined. The complaint complied in all respects with the requirements of the pertinent statute approved March 25th, 1885. (Gen. Sta., p. 1534), and of the rules of the police department, but the board refused to entertain it, on the ground that it involved a criminal offense, and therefore “as a matter of right to the policeman” the offense must first be passed on by the grand jury, before the board had authority to consider the charge. The Relator now ask for a mandamus commanding the board to hear, try and determine the complaint. Under the First and Police act of May 2d, 1885 (Gen. Stat. p. 155`), the board is “entrusted with the government, control and management of the police department,” and has “full power and right to suspend and to expel or discharge any person employed or appointed in or under the department +++provided good cause shall be shown for such suspension, expulsion or discharge after an investigation by such board. The trust thus confided, the power thus delegated, carries with it a corresponding duty to exercise the power in all proper cases. The complaint of the Relator appears to us to have stated a proper case. It charged an abuse by the police of the Official power which he possessed for the protection of persons and the upholding of law. It charged a course of conduct which, if generally pursued by police officers, would defeat the end for which their department of government is organized. If proved, good cause would be shown for the suspension or expulsion of the delinquent, within the meaning of the statute. That his conduct might likewise involve discipline him as a policeman. The object of such discipline to secure fit men for the performance of police duty, and surely a thief is none the less unfit to protect citizens against theft because he has not yet been convicted of larceny. Clearly the board had power to investigate the charge, and as they declined to exercise their jurisdiction on an erroneous opinion that they were without authority, a mandamus should be awarded. King v. Justices of Kent, 14 East 395; Regina v. Leicester, 15 Q. B. 671; Regina v. Mayor of Monmouth, L.R.,5 Q. 251; Stryker v. Skillman, 2 Gr. 189. Let a preemptory writ issue, pursuant to the rule. See Skillman v. Police Commissioners 64 N.J. L.
Locke alleged Haessig was liable because of how she responded to his complaint that her subordinate, a parole officer, was sexually harassing Locke, a parolee. Locke has provided evidence that Haessig was told of the harassment, failed to intervene or investigate, and then threatened to retaliate against Locke for complaining.
The district court denied Haessig’s motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. We affirm the denial of qualified immunity. Adam A. Locke, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Mya Haessig, Defendant-Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. No. 10-CV-430-JPS—J.P. Stadtmueller, Judge. Argued October 31, 2014 — Decided June 5, 2015 Hamilton, Circuit Judge. See Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d at 454–56 (reversing summary judgment on equal protection claim; school officials ignored male plaintiff’s complaints of harassment but acted on female students’ harassment complaints); see also Bohen v. City of East Chicago, 799 F.2d at 1190 (Posner, J., concurring) (“The chief of the fire department was aware of the harassment, which was frequent rather than isolated and in which at least one supervisory employee was implicated; yet he did nothing. It was as if the chief knew that his men were systematically refusing to put out fires in homes owned by blacks, yet did nothing to correct the situation.”). Short perhaps only of a confession of intentional discrimination, selective inaction can be strong evidence of discriminatory intent.
A policy implemented by a city’s police department and the county’s district attorney against entertaining criminal cross-complaints was held to hear no rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest in impartial law enforcement, and thus violated the equal protection rights of an arrestee who was named as the perpetrator in an original complaint arising out of the commission of a crime.
The court found that the assumption that the original complainant was the true victim caused the police to fail to investigate further, and the prosecutor to consider evidence potentially favorable to the arrestee. The court deemed the policy to be based on irrelevant and irrational considerations.‘[a] first come-first served policy also runs contrary to the objectives of law enforcement to protect the public, since it inhibits collection of the fullest possible information from all sources relating to a potentially criminal incident. See Myer v. County of Orange, 870 F.Supp. at 557.
In sum, by severely distorting the ends of justice in an attempt to resolve complaints efficiently, the cross-complaint policy serves no legitimate governmental interest. The issue, however, is not whether a DA must prosecute cross-complaints simultaneously, but whether a DA and a police department must entertain cross-complaints on the same basis as original complaints, investigate all complaints based on the circumstances of the case rather than on the order in which they were filed, and on that basis determine who, if anyone, should be prosecuted. To fail to do so, we believe, distorts the even-handed pursuit of justice and violates the Equal Protection Clause.” See Myers v. County of Orange, 15 E3d 66 (2nd Cir. 1998); cert. den., 64 CrL 216(1999).
See Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d at 454–56 (reversing summary judgment on equal protection claim; school officials ignored male plaintiff’s complaints of harassment but acted on female students’ harassment complaints); see also Bohen v. City of East Chicago, 799 F.2d at 1190 (Posner, J., concurring) (“The chief of the fire department was aware of the harassment, which was frequent rather than isolated and in which at least one supervisory employee was implicated; yet he did nothing. It was as if the chief knew that his men were systematically refusing to put out fires in homes owned by blacks, yet did nothing to correct the situation.”). Short perhaps only of a confession of intentional discrimination, selective inaction can be strong evidence of discriminatory intent.
“Holding that a prosecutor’s exercise of independent judgment was not a superseding cause where the prosecutor was constrained by the police department’s failure to investigate certain claims”Bermudez v. City of N.Y., Docket No. 14-1125-cv (2d Cir. Jun 15, 2015)
“Finding that municipal policy of investigating only first-filed complaints and prohibiting cross-complaints violated the Equal Protection Clause”Troy v. City of N.Y., 13-cv-5082 (AJN) (S.D.N.Y. Sep 25, 2014
“Finding that where a district attorney implements an unconstitutional policy directing a police department and assistant district attorneys not to entertain cross-complaints, that policy is imputed to the county”DEJEAN v. COUNTY OF NASSAU, CV-06-6317 (SJF) (AKT). (E.D.N.Y. Jan 03, 2008)
“Recognizing police officers’ testimony as sufficient to establish a county “policy” causing a constitutional violation”McDAY v. TRAVIS, 303 Fed.Appx. 928 (2d Cir. 2008)
“Declining to decide whether such a blanket policy also violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause”FOX v. CITY OF NEW YORK, 03 Civ. 2268 (FM) (S.D.N.Y. Apr 19, 2004)
“Noting Second Circuit’s holding that “a county could be held liable for the management of the district attorney’s office and a long history of negligent disciplinary practices regarding law enforcement personnel””Peters v. City of Buffalo, 848 F.Supp.2d 378 (W.D.N.Y. 2012)
The Lower court recognized that the right to equal protection of the law as well as the due process clause may be implicated by the failure to provide police protection. The equal protection argument has also been successful in other places. A failure to provide police protection because of the race of the victim and/or the assailant was found in Hawk v. Perillo to give rise to a cause under section 1983. Pursuit of a policy not to file criminal complaints against individuals engaged in attacks upon members of a racial group may be actionable. Moody v. City if Hoboken, 785 F. Supp. 1027 (D.N.J. 1991); Farrar v. City of Chicago, 291 F. Supp. 2d 747 (N.D. IIII. 2003).
Note that, in all types of criminal cases, prosecutorial bias may deny crime victims much needed protection from revictimization. A district attorney may refuse to charge an offender out of an improper motive unrelated to the merits of the case. See infra notes 64-71 and accompanying text. Because of the virtually unlimited discretion prosecutors enjoy, such conduct is difficult to curb. See infra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
A racially biased prosecutor, for example, can inject personal prejudices into all the discretionary stages of the prosecutorial process. See, e.g., Patermoster, Race of Victim and Location of Crime: The Decision to Seek the Death Penalty in South Carolina, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 754, 767-85 (1983) (a study found that the race of victim and killer has a large influence on the prosecutor’s decision to seek the death penalty in murder cases in South Carolina).
This prejudice is particularly apparent when the prosecutor refuses to file a charge because of the race of the victim. See Comment, Prosecutorial Discretion in the Initiation of Criminal Complaints, 42 S. CAL. L. REv. 519, 528 (1969) (explaining that minority groups are denied equal protection of the laws when prosecutors fail to prosecute offenses against members of that group); infra note 69 and accompanying text. The Criminal Division’s mission is to protect the community by upholding the laws of this state in a fair and impartial manner.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey ruled in STATE of New Jersey IN the INTEREST OF A.B. Decided: September 24, 2014 “[a] victim of a crime shall be treated with fairness, compassion and respect,” N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 22, and that a witness has the right “[t]o be free from intimidation, harassment or abuse by any person including the defendant or [his attorney],” N.J.S.A. 52:4B–36(c). See, e.g., State v. Means, 191 N.J. 610, 620, 926 A.2d 328 (2007) (“The trial court should consider the concerns of the victim or the victim’s family ; State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 556, 737 A.2d 55 (1999).
Nevertheless, let us be clear: victims have a right “[t]o be free from intimidation, harassment or abuse.” N.J.S.A. 52:4B–36(c). (See State Of New Jersey, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. GIUSEPPE TEDESCO, Defendant–Appellant. A–50 September Term 2012 Decided): June 24, 2013 the sentencing court cited the Crime Victim’s Bill of Rights, N.J.S.A. 52:4B–34 to –38, which details various rights that crime victims and witnesses possess, see N.J.S.A. 52:4B–36, and grants victims standing to file a motion to enforce those rights, N.J.S.A. 52:4B–36r.
The court also referenced the Victim’s Rights Amendment, which grants victims the right to be treated with “fairness, compassion and respect.” See N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 22. Victims also have standing to enforce their rights under the State Constitution. N.J.S.A. 52:4B–36r. The victim’s arguments should be heard and evaluated, if not as a party with standing, then as an amicus under Rule 1:13–9.
The Crime Victims’ Law Center that represents the victim has appeared as amicus before the Court in the past. We are satisfied that the victim’s participation in this case “will assist in the resolution of an issue of public importance.” The victims’ interests must be considered as well. In recent years, a series of changes in the law has steadily strengthened the rights of victims to participate in criminal proceedings. In 1985, the Legislature passed the landmark Crime Victim’s Bill of Rights, N.J.S.A. 52:4B–34 to –38, to recognize and protect the rights of crime victims and witnesses, N.J.S.A. 52:4B–35.
The law states that victims are entitled “[t]o be treated with dignity and compassion by the criminal justice system,” N.J.S.A. 52:4B–36a, and “[t]o be informed about the criminal justice process,” N.J.S.A. 52:4B–36b. The original statute also identified a number of specific rights. See L. 1985, c. 249, § 3 (codified as amended at N.J.S.A. 52:4B–36a to l).
Later in 1991, the voters ratified an amendment to the State Constitution, which directly addressed the rights of crime victims. The Victim’s Rights Amendment provides that [a] victim of a crime shall be treated with fairness, compassion and respect by the criminal justice system.
A victim of a crime shall not be denied the right to be present at public judicial proceedings except when, prior to completing testimony as a witness, the victim is properly sequestered in accordance with law or the Rules Governing the Courts of the State of New Jersey.
A victim of a crime shall be entitled to those rights and remedies as may be provided by the Legislature. For the purposes of this paragraph, “victim of a crime” means: a) a person who has suffered physical or psychological injury or has incurred loss of or damage to personal or real property as a result of a crime or an incident involving another person operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of drugs or alcohol, and b) the spouse, parent, legal guardian, grandparent, child or sibling of the decedent in the case of a criminal homicide. [N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 22.]
The Crime Victim’s Bill of Rights was amended again in 2012. See L. 2012, c. 27, § 1. Among other changes, the amendment gave victims the right to be free from “harassment or abuse by any person including the defendant.” Ibid. (codified at N.J.S.A. 52:4B–36c). The revisions also included the standing provision discussed above. Ibid. (codified at N.J.S.A. 52:4B–36r). Those developments reveal a steady movement in the law to recognize and enhance the rights of crime victims. See Blackmon, supra, 202 N.J. at 298–99 (reviewing recent history of victims’ rights); State v. Muhammad, 145 N.J. 23, 32–35 (1996) (same).
There can be little doubt that from the standpoint of the victims, who are to be treated with fairness, compassion, respect, and dignity. As always, judges must ensure the solemnity of the proceedings. Finally, courts should consider the State’s interest in deterring others. Turner, supra, 532 F.Supp. at 915 (quoting Note, Procedural Due Process at Judicial Sentencing for Felony, supra, 81 Harv. L.Rev. at 831).
That interest is also affected by the severity of the crime. If the case involves a substantial public interest, a person has standing to bring action………..if he or she has merely a slight private interest. Elizabeth Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Howell, 24 N.J. 488, 132 A. 2d 779 (1957). Cases involving misfeasance, malfeasance, or corruption of local officials. Driscoll v. Burlington-Bristol Bridge Co., 8 N.J. 433, 86 A. 2d 201 (1952). See BRISCOE v. LaHUE, 460 U.S. 325, 365 demonstrating that Congress, when enacting the Civil Rights legislation was hostile to the considerable CORRUPTION of the Judiciary and the Legal system: See, e. g., Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 78 (Rep. Perry) (“Sheriffs, having eyes to see, see not; judges, having ears to hear, hear not; witnesses conceal the truth or falsify it; grand and petit juries act as if they might be accomplices”); id., at 394 (Rep. Rainey) (“[T]he courts are in many instances under the control of those who are wholly inimical to the impartial administration of law and equity”); id., at App. 186 (Rep. Platt). See, e.g., Twp. of Neptune v. State, Dept. of Env. Prot., 425 N.J. Super. 422, 434 (App. Div. 2012).
The public has an interest in the effective and fair administration of justice. That calls for resolving matters fairly, openly, and expeditiously, in the presence of all parties and counsel, and in a way that promotes respect for our system of justice. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606, 102 S.Ct. 2613, 2619–20, 73 L. Ed.2d 248, 256–57 (1982); State v. Deutsch, 34 N.J. 190, 206 (1961). The public also has an interest in holding defendants publicly accountable for their actions once. See United States v. Turner, 532 F.Supp. 913, 915 (N.D.Cal.1982) (quoting Note, Procedural Due Process at Judicial Sentencing for Felony, 81 Harv. L.Rev. 821, 831 (1968)).
The more serious the offense, the stronger that interest is. See Dunne, supra, 124 N.J. at 314–15, 317. In the context of sentencing in a democratic society, public accountability includes having the judge speak openly and directly to the defendant. The Defendants misconduct in this case falls well outside even the most expansive definition of “objective reasonableness. As to the latter, it hardly requires the citation of case law to posit that a police officer’s planting evidence and committing perjury in order to “frame” a suspect is a violation of the Due Process Clause. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court did hold in Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 216, 63 S.Ct. 177, 87 L.Ed. 214 (1942), that “perjured testimony knowingly used by the state authorities to sustain [defendant’s] conviction” and “deliberate suppression by these same authorities of evidence favorable to him” violates the Constitution. See also Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) (suppression of exculpatory evidence–e.g., that the police witnesses lied–violates Due Process).
Nor can it be seriously argued that the right to not be deliberately and falsely accused by the police is not clearly established. Indeed, the underlying principle that “Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor” is part of the fabric of our culture, and considerably predates even the Supreme Court’s decision in Pyle. See Exodus 20:13. DARELL DEON CHANCELLOR v. CITY OF DETROIT, a Municipal Corporation, P.O. WILLIAM “ROBO COP” MELENDEZ, P.O. TROY BRADLEY, P.O. JEFFREY WEISS, Individually and in their official capacity and CMDR. CHARLES BARBIERI, in his official capacity, jointly and severally. Case No. 03-40344
Equal Protection under the Thirteenth Amendment In the Civil Rights cases Mr. Justice Harlan argued, quite correctly it is suggested, that as to Negroes the Thirteenth Amendment invalidates” all discriminations against them, because of their race, in respect of such civil rights as belong to freemen of other races.” Civil Rights Cases, supra note 64. However, when the racial discrimination or other imposed inequality amounts to peonage, the Thirteenth Amendment perforce strikes down the in equality.
In Bolling v. Sharpe 347 U.S. 497 (1954), the Supreme Court held the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause to include an equal protection element identical in effect to that of the fourteenth amendment. And, the following year, 1948, the Court, although not specifically referring to the Fifth Amendment, indicated very positively that equal protection is “a part of the public policy of the United States. “In this case, Hurd v. Hodge, the Court stated that it would violate this policy” to permit federal courts in the Nation’s capital to exercise general equity powers to compel action denied the states where such action has been held to be violative of the guarantee of equal protection of the laws. 334 U.S. 24, 35(1948).
Equality under the Privileges and Immunities Clauses under Article IV, Section 2, of the United States Constitution, non citizens of a state are assured that in their “fundamental” privileges and immunities they will be accorded equality with citizens of the state. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. No.1312 at 551 (E.D.Pa.1823). Mitchell v. United States, supra note 77; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat.1 (U.S.1824); Houston, East & W. Texas Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S.342 (1914); Railroad Commission v. Chicago, B.& Q. Rr., 25 7 U.S. 563 (1922). Comment, 40 Mica. L. Rv. 711, 728 (1942). Note, 42 COL.L. Rev. 139, 140 (1942).