Recently, probable cause findings were made against White Male Police Officers who gunned a young black male named Tamir Rice.
The Honorable Judge Ronald Adrine, found probable cause for charges of murder, involuntary manslaughter, reckless homicide, negligent homicide, and dereliction of duty against Cleveland Officer, Timothy Loehmann,(one of the officers involved in the case). Additionally, the judge found probable cause for charges of negligent homicide and dereliction of duty against Frank Garmback,(the other officer).
The Crime Victim-Witness advocates, on behalf of Tamir Rice, filed affidavits using Ohio law that allows any citizen with knowledge of the facts of a case to formally ask a judge to issue an arrest warrant. Judge Adrine did not order the officers to be arrested. This conduct by State Judges is not new. During the beginning of the Jim Crow Era, judges consistently refused to find probable cause when complained to by Black citizens.
Judges can’t issue warrants unless a criminal complaint from a prosecutor exists, according to the opinion. Citizens came together and exercised their freedoms of speech, rights to petition and crime victims-witness rights, by filing criminal complaints and affidavits reflecting the Private Attorney General methods I use addressing false arrests, false imprisonment, false swearing, false reporting, false issuance of criminal complaints, assault, human trafficking, peonage and official deprivation of civil rights , subjected to by Lynn A. Wehling, a Cumberland County Prosecutors Office Detective. Her TEAM included individuals from the city of Vineland Police Department and the New Jersey State Police. Probable cause was found once more against Wehling upon complaints submitted by Abul Bey for similar crimes such as False Swearing and false imprisonment.
Similar to Tamir Rice’s case, probable cause in “State v. Wehling” , was found against that individual. The only different was in State v. Wehling, criminal complaints were actually issued; however, as with Rice’s case, the Judge did not issue an arrest warrants! The Judge’s decision in State v. Wehling to not issue arrest warrants was inconsistent with the Bail Fee Schedules and Court Rules.
Additionally, a finding of probable cause was made against Wehling for a violation of Federal Law. A law existing specifically, by Congress’s authority, to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment. This is called Peonage. Peonage is another term for the conditions placed on blacks after the passing of the thirteenth amendment. Blacks were subjected to unlawful debts and forced to work to pay the debt off. Often times, many were not able expunge their debts, thus perpetually creating slaves all over again. Coincidentally and ironically, this happened right after the laws on Slavery were amended. Black people were easily hustled and socially blinded by the assertions of slavery being abolished. Amendments to existing laws governing slavery is what actually occurred. Federal and State prosecutors enforced civil rights of persons perceived as Black from their priority lists.
This was a chess move and calls for the re-activation of the Freedmen’s Bureau. That very chess move further cements my point to inform those not understanding how Tamir Rice was denied Equal Protection. His advocates were denied equal protections and benefits of all laws and proceedings. Before his Fourteenth Amendment violations are addressed, we, along with his advocates, must address his and our Thirteenth Amendment violations.
By the Revised Statutes of Kentucky, published A.D. 1860, [Footnote 1] it is enacted:
“That a slave, negro, or Indian shall be a competent witness in the case of the commonwealth for or against a slave, negro, or Indian or in a civil case to which only negroes or Indians are parties, but in no other case.”
In this state of things, Congress on the 9th April, 1866, passed an act entitled “An act to protect all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and furnish the means of their vindication.” [Footnote 3] The first section of that act declared all Page 80 U. S. 582 persons born in the United States, and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, to be citizens of the United States, and it enacted that: “Such citizens, of every race and color, shall have the same right in every state and territory in the United States to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom to the contrary notwithstanding.” The second section enacted: “That any person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, shall subject or cause to be subjected any inhabitant of any state or territory to the deprivation of any right, secured or protected by this act or to different punishment, pains, or penalties on account of such person’s having at any time been held in a condition of slavery or involuntary servitude except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, or by reason of his color or race, than is prescribed for the punishment of which persons, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall, on conviction thereof, be punished,”
The clause in question is intended to reach these cases, or at least a large class of them. It provides a remedy where the state refuses to give one; where the mischief consists in inaction or refusal to act, or refusal to give requisite relief; whereas the second section provides for actual, positive invasion of rights. Thus, if the state should refuse to allow a freedman to sue in its courts, thereby denying him judicial relief, or should fail to provide laws for the punishment of white persons guilty of criminal acts against his person or property, thereby denying him judicial redress, there can be no doubt that the case would come within the scope of the clause under consideration. Suppose that, in any state, assault and battery, mayhem — nay, murder itself — could be perpetrated upon a colored man with impunity, no law being provided for punishing the offender, would not that be a case of denial of rights to the colored population of that state? Would not the clause of the civil rights bill now under consideration give jurisdiction to the United States courts in such a case? Yet if an indictment should be found in one of those courts against the offender, the technical parties to the record would only be the United States as plaintiff and the criminal as defendant. Nevertheless could it be said, with any truth or justice, that this would not be a cause affecting persons denied the rights secured to them by the first section of the law? Civil society has deprived us of the natural right of avenging ourselves, but it has preserved to us all the more jealously the right of bringing the offender to justice. By the common law of England, the injured party was the actual prosecutor of criminal offenses, although the proceeding was in the King’s name; but in felonies, which involved a forfeiture to the Crown of the criminal’s property, it was also the duty of the Crown officers to superintend the prosecution. And although in this country it is almost the universal practice to appoint public and official prosecutors in criminal cases, yet it is the right of the injured party, and a duty he owes to society, to furnish what aid he can in bringing the offender to justice, and an important part of that right and duty consists in giving evidence against him.To deprive a whole class of the community of this right, to refuse their evidence and their sworn complaints, is to brand them with a badge of slavery; is to expose them to wanton insults and fiendish assaults; is to leave their lives, their families, and their property unprotected by law. It gives unrestricted license and impunity to vindictive outlaws and felons to rush upon these helpless people and kill and slay them at will, as was done in this case. To say that actions or prosecutions intended for the redress of such outrages are not “causes affecting the persons” who are the victims of them is to take, it seems to me, a view of the law too narrow, too technical, and too forgetful of the liberal objects it had in view. If, in such a raid as I have supposed, a colored person is merely wounded or maimed, but is still capable of making complaint, and on appearing to do so, has the doors of justice shut in his face on the ground that he is a colored person, and cannot testify against a white citizen, it seems to me almost a stultification of the law to say that the case is not within its scope.
InMyers v. County of Orange, 15 E3d 66 (2nd Cir. 1998); cert. den., 64 CrL 216! (1999). A policy implemented by a city’s police department and the county’s district attorney against entertaining criminal cross-complaints was held to hear no rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest in impartial law enforcement, and thus violated the equal protection rights of an arrestee who was named as the perpetrator in an original complaint arising out of the commission of a crime. The court found that the assumption that the original complainant was the true victim caused the police to fail to investigate further, and the prosecutor to consider evidence potentially favorable to the arrestee. The court deemed the policy to be based on irrelevant and irrational considerations. ‘[a] first come-first served policy also runs contrary to the objectives of law enforcement to protect the public, since it inhibits collection of the fullest possible information from all sources relating to a potentially criminal incident.’ [Myer v. County of Orange, 870 F.Supp.] at 557. By undermining the ability of the police department and the DA to gather all available evidence, the cross-complaint policy creates an unnecessary risk that innocent persons will he prosecuted and possibly convicted. In sum, by severely distorting the ends of justice in an attempt to resolve complaints efficiently, the cross-complaint policy serves no legitimate governmental interest. We note that Port Jervis conceded as much at oral argument. “Orange County replies that ‘prosecuting both cross.. . complaints simultaneously’ would create ‘the appearance of a conflict or impropriety’ and cause unnecessary ‘delay and expense.’ The issue, however, is not whether a DA must prosecute cross-complaints simultaneously, but whether a DA and a police department must entertain cross-complaints on the same basis as original complaints, investigate all complaints based on the circumstances of the case rather than on the order in which they were filed, and on that basis determine who, if anyone, should be prosecuted. To fail to do so, we believe, distorts the even-handed pursuit of justice and violates the Equal Protection Clause.”