After audit of the complaints in this case which are pictured below with red arrows it was revealed that the Municipal Judge allowed a deprivation of due process in direct violation of NJ Court Rule 7:2 which constitutes a violation of procedural due process which is guaranteed by the Federal and State Constitutions.In State v. Fisher: “The panel agreed with the trial court’s legal analysis and conclusion that the unsigned ticket was ineffective because it “lack[ed] an attestation of probable cause.” Id. at 110, 831 A.2d at 128.
Also note that the MUNICIPAL COURTS – REVISIONS TO THE SPECIAL FORM OF COMPLAINT AND SUMMONS (“SPECIAL FORM”) Section C. states: “Use of the Special Form when the Officer Prepares but does not Issue the Complaint. There are times when an officer decides to prepare a complaint, but elects not to issue process on it (the summons). When this occurs, the complaint initiated should be processed pursuant to R. 7:2-2(a)(1) (Citizens Complaint). The officer should complete only the complaint portion of this Special Form, provide the defendant (when in the presence of the officer) with the optional green courtesy copy and submit the court’s blue and defendant’s yellow (hard copy) copies of this Special Form to the court. It will then be the court’s responsibility to determine probable cause. The officer may retain the officer’s pink copy. If it is determined by the court that the complaint and summons will be issued, the completed defendant’s yellow copy of this Special Form is to be served on the defendant, pursuant to R. 7:2-4(a)(1). The municipal court is responsible for notifying the defendant of the outcome of the judicial probable cause determination and for providing the completed agency white copy to the appropriate enforcement agency. See 9/17/09 NOTICE TO THE BAR MUNICIPAL COURTS – REVISIONS TO THE SPECIAL FORM OF COMPLAINT AND SUMMONS (“SPECIAL FORM”) In this case as we all can see the officer did not complete the “Complaint portion of this Special Form” and there is not finding of probable cause by a Judicial Officer.
One must ask why then, did this municipal judge allowed a prosecution, enter a conviction and assess fines and penalties, such as suspension of license and 90 days in jail, when he knew the complaint section of the tickets must be signed under the Rules Governing the Courts of New Jersey, yet herein as we all can see this judge did not follow nor uphold the Rules Governing the Courts of New Jersey, thus implemented a Badge of Slavery on the accused and denied Equal Benefits of the Rules Governing the Courts of New Jersey. Another, interesting aspect is the complaining witness was or is perceived to be a White Male and the defendant assumed by the State and or Court to be “Black” based on his “Color” or “Complexion”. See Un-sworn Complaint was a Fundamental Defect in Liquor License Case
In Park 6 LLC v. City of Racine, 2011AP2282 (Oct. 10, 2012), a three-judge panel of the District II Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding the defect was a fundamental error precluding the Common Council’s jurisdiction to revoke Holmes’s liquor license. The appeals panel rejected the city’s argument that the formalities in administrative proceedings are sometimes excusable as technical defects if procedurally cured. “An oath or swearing requirement is important. The solemnity imposed by an oath requires the actor to stop and consider the allegations he or she is making,” wrote Chief Appeals Court Judge Richard Brown, noting that requiring the sworn oath prevents “baseless harassment.” Rejecting the requirement as a “legal trapping,” Chief Judge Brown explained that the oath requirement preserves minimal due process rights protecting unwarranted attacks. See Judge Harold W. George from Trenton Alumni Chapter of Kappa Alpha Psi Discussing Community Efforts
Accordingly, since most prosecutions in Washington are commenced by information, Washington law requires, in compliance with the constitutional command, that an arrest warrant be supported by either an affidavit “or sworn testimony establishing the grounds for issuing the warrant.” The “Certification for Determination of Probable Cause” executed by petitioner was designed to satisfy those requirements. Although the law required that document to be sworn or certified under penalty of perjury, neither federal nor state law made it necessary for the prosecutor to make that certification. In doing so, petitioner performed an act that any competent witness might have performed. Even if she may have been following a practice that was routinely employed by her colleagues and predecessors in King County, Washington, that practice is surely not prevalent in other parts of the country and is not even mandated by law in King County. Notes 1. Washington Criminal Rule 2.2(a); see Wash. Rev. Code §9A.72.085 (1994) (providing, inter alia, that a certification made under penalty of perjury is the equivalent of an affidavit). Accord, King County Local Criminal Rule 2.2. See SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 96—792 LYNNE KALINA, PETITIONER v. RODNEY FLETCHER ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT [December 10, 1997]
Superior level New Jersey Courts have already addressed the issue of “Un-Signed Complaints” in State v. Fisher where the Court ruled that: “Our [New Jersey] court rules, which govern the contents and issuance of traffic complaints and summonses, provide that the Uniform … Ticket is to serve “as the complaint, summons or other process․ for all…offenses[.]” Thus the Judge operates one way in Court rendering official oppression and presents himself in another light on video. See State of New Jersey v. John W. FISHER, Decided: July 12, 2004
In State v. Brennan, the State concedes, and it is fundamental, that a complaint must be signed for there to be valid filing of the complaint before the statute of limitations has expired. While the State concedes that the officer’s failure to sign the complaint is not merely a “technical omission,” it asserts that the issuing officer corrected the defect by signing the complaint sometime after it was issued. The record, however, does not reflect when the officer’s signature was added. See State v. Brennan Annotate this Case 229 N.J. Super. 342 (1988) 551 A.2d 560
In State v. Fisher R. 7:2-1(b)(1).1 Because the ticket embodies both the complaint and summons, it must comply with our court rules dealing with both instruments. The complaint is “a written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged[.]” R. 7:2-1(a). See State v. Brennan Annotate this Case 229 N.J. Super. 342 (1988) 551 A.2d 560Like a criminal indictment, its primary purpose is “to inform a defendant of the charges he must defend against.” State v. Salzman, 228 N.J.Super. 109, 114, 549 A.2d 46, 49 (App.Div.1987).
Under Rule 7:2-1(b)(2), the complaint “may be made and signed by any person [.]” In contrast to the complaint, the summons, which requires the defendant’s appearance in court at a stated time and place, “shall be signed and issued only by a law enforcement officer or the judge, municipal court administrator or deputy court administrator of the court having territorial jurisdiction.” See State v. Brennan Annotate this Case 229 N.J. Super. 342 (1988) 551 A.2d 560 R. 7:2-1(b)(2) (emphasis added). Because a citizen has no authority to issue a summons, Rule 7:2-2(a)(1) requires a judge or judicial officer to determine that “there is probable cause to believe that an offense was committed and the defendant has committed it” before a summons can be issued on a citizen complaint. Conversely, when a law enforcement officer makes a complaint, as in this case, “[a] summons ․ may be issued by [that] officer without a finding by a judicial officer of probable cause.” See State v. Brennan Annotate this Case 229 N.J. Super. 342 (1988) 551 A.2d 560
R. 7:2-2(a)(2); see also Gonzalez, supra, 114 N.J. at 605-06, 556 A.2d at 329-30 (holding that neither public policy nor State or federal constitutions require independent determination of probable cause to support traffic ticket issued by law enforcement officer). In sum, the Uniform Traffic…….., as evidenced by the above description of its contents, combines the requisites of the complaint and summons in one form. Accordingly, it enables a law enforcement officer to make the complaint and serve process on the defendant at the time of the stop…..courts, including Latorre and Ryfa, that have refused to “exalt technical and literal strictness” at the expense of “essential justice” are faithful to the express intent of our court rules. See State v. Brennan Annotate this Case 229 N.J. Super. 342 (1988) 551 A.2d 560 Their approach to defective traffic complaints and summonses properly accommodates the interests of defendants, the State, and the judicial system. We, therefore, agree that an officer’s failure to attest to probable cause by signing the Uniform Traffic Ticket proves fatal to the prosecution only when that omission defeats the purposes intended to be served by the ticket or when the error otherwise prejudices the defendant. Consequently, the officer’s signature provides the only concrete evidence that the quasi-criminal proceeding has been instituted in good faith and by a person authorized to do so. State v. Fisher, 363 N.J.Super. 108, 831 A.2d 126 (2003)