The rule perpetuates the practice of private prosecution, which traces its origins to ancient England. Private prosecution derives from the practice of trial by combat, which evolved into the prosecution of criminal charges by private parties. Sir James Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England 245 (1883). By the early nineteenth century, Britain’s system of private prosecution was in retreat. See Andrew Sidman, Comment, The Outmoded Concept of Private Prosecution, 25 Am. U. L. Rev. 754, 760 (1976); Judson Hand, Note, Primitive Justice: Private Prosecutions in Municipal Court Under New Jersey Rule 7:4-4(b), 44 Rutgers L. Rev. 205, 212 (1991).
In 1879, Parliament created the Office of Public Prosecutions, which prosecuted serious crimes. Twenty-nine years later, Parliament enacted the Prosecution of Offenses Act, which allows the Director of Public Prosecutions to supersede a private prosecution. Hand, supra, 44 Rutgers L. Rev. at 212. Although uncommon in England today, private prosecution survives. Id. Few doctrines were more solidly established at common law than the immunity of judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction, as [the] Court recognized when it adopted the doctrine, in Bradley v Fisher, 13 Wall 335, 20 L ed 646 (1872).
This immunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly, and it “is not for the protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence and without fear of consequences.” (Scott v. Stansfield, LR 3 Ex 220, 223 (1868), quoted in Bradley v Fisher, supra, 349; note, at 350, 20 L ed at 650.) [Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554, 87 S. Ct. 1213, 1217-18, 18 L. Ed.2d 288, 294 (1967).] “The principle of judicial immunity has remained viable in the face of challenges in some very emotionally and politically charged cases.” Jarvis v. Drake, 830 P.2d 23, 26 (Kan. 1992).
The extension of an absolute privilege to jurors, witnesses, and parties and their representatives is grounded in similar public-policy concerns. In Fenning v. S.G. Holding Corp., 47 N.J. Super. 110 (App. Div. 1957), the late Chief Justice Hughes, then sitting in the Appellate Division, explained our adherence to the doctrine of litigation immunity: The doctrine that an absolute immunity exists in respect of statements, even those defamatory and malicious, made in the course of proceedings before a court of justice, and having some relation thereto, is a principle firmly established, and is responsive to the supervening public policy that persons in such circumstances be permitted to speak and write freely without the restraint of fear of an ensuing defamation action, this sense of freedom being indispensable to the due administration of justice. [Id. at 117 (citations omitted).]
Our doctrine derives from the English rule of immunity. The English rule differs slightly from the American rule in that England affords a true, absolute privilege without regard to the relevancy of the statements to the subject matter of the proceedings. Id. at 118 (citing Munster v. Lamb,  11 Q.B.D. 588). The only dilution of the rule [of absolute immunity] which has occurred in New Jersey (and most American jurisdictions) is the requirement that the defamatory matter uttered have some relation to the nature of the proceedings. Thus, statements made in the course of judicial proceedings, but not relevant thereto, are excluded from the privilege.
In one case, for example, a judge whose subject matter jurisdiction to issue arrest warrants was limited to crimes committed within his judicial district lost judicial immunity when he signed an arrest warrant based on a complaint of criminal conduct which he knew occurred outside his territorial jurisdiction./23/ Not only did he exceed his jurisdiction, but also he acted in the complete absence of subject matter jurisdiction./24/ http://federalpracticemanual.org/node/48#24
In order to protect the sanctity of judicial deliberations, judges acting in their official capacities are generally immune from a suit for monetary damages, including in § 1983 actions. Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 2000); Gallas v. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 211 F.3d 760, 768 (3d Cir. 2000). Municipal court judges, presiding over courts of limited jurisdiction, are afforded the same protections of the immunity as judges of general jurisdiction. Figueroa, 441-443, 445. Courts apply a two-part inquiry to determine if judicial immunity will not apply. See Gallas, 211 F.3d at 768. First, judicial immunity does not apply to non-judicial actions. Id. Determination of the type of action depends on “the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978). Second, judicial immunity will not apply where the acts, even if judicial in nature, are “taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). Actions taken that may be in excess of jurisdiction are, however, entitled to judicial immunity. Gallas, 211 F.3d at 769.
Challenges to a judge’s immunity are not overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice. See Mireles, 502 U.S.at 11. Neither may a judge be held liable for his conduct as a judicial officer because the outcome is considered unfair, controversial, or incorrect. See Gallas, 211 17 F.3d at 769. Courts, therefore, focus on the challenged action and not the underlying mental state or motive of the officer. See id. The Court finds proposed Defendant Borow is entitled to judicial immunity because Plaintiff’s allegations encompass actions taken by Borow in his role as municipal judge. In Count Eleven, Plaintiff claims Borow denied him a right to a fair trial, claiming Borow found jurisdiction over him, proceed with a trial, entered into the record a name other than Aaron Shabazz, and took a long time reaching a decision. From these allegations, Plaintiff draws evidence of bias and conspiracy with the other defendants to further deprive Plaintiff of his rights. 6 It is clear to the Court that Plaintiff’s allegations source in Borow’s conduct as a judicial officer in and around the trial. Plaintiff’s claims of conspiracy and bias stem from the proceeding and outcome of the trial and improperly argue against Borow’s motives and decisions. See Gallas, 211 F.3d at 769. The Court thus finds judicial immunity applies and Plaintiff’s amendments to add claims and allegations against Borow are futile