In El v. Wehling, the plaintiff asserted that he was treated differently than two persons of Hispanic descent and one White person where he and the other three like him were subjected to criminal suspicion and investigation, the only similar difference between the plaintiff and those three individuals was specifically that the plaintiff is a Moor, Muslim, Dark Skin pigmented, Perceived to be Black whereas the two Hispanic individuals were not dark skin pigmented and were not perceived to be “Black” who were subject to criminal suspicion and investigation were not handcuffed, fingerprinted, jailed, incarcerated in general and definitely not subject to that treatment without probable cause findings being made and verified by a Judicial Officer.
Lynn Wehling was also not perceived to be “Black”, was not dark skin pigmented, she also was not subjected to arrest, fingerprinting, prosecution, processing or jail time. There were no probable cause findings made against the plaintiff, but there were probable cause findings made against Wehling by Judge Kasper. Yet, District Judge Simandle in his opinion in El v. Wehling asserted that the plaintiff did not establish the first and second prong for an equal protection claim to go forward. Check out his decision on Equal protection in an earlier case and compare it with his decision in El v. Wehling. Thus plaintiff plead facts constituting that Similarly-situated white and Hispanic individuals subject to criminal suspicion or criminal investigation with probable cause findings made against them are not subject to arrest, processing, fingerprinting and prosecution with and without probable cause findings being made by a judicial officer.
ROBERT MITCHELL, v. TOWNSHIP OF WILLINGBORO MUNCIPALITY GOVERNMENT, et al.,
In order to bring an equal protection claim based on racial profiling under 42 U.S.C. 1983, Plaintiff must show that the officer‟s conduct (1) had a discriminatory effect and (2) was motivated by a discriminatory purpose. Bradley v. U.S., 299 F.3d 197, 205-06 (3d Cir. 2002). To demonstrate a discriminatory effect, Plaintiff must prove that he “is a member of a protected class and that [he] was treated differently from similarly situated individuals in an unprotected class.” Id. at 206. As an African-American, Plaintiff is a member of a protected class. See, e.g., Waiters v. Hudson County Correctional Center, Civ. No. 07-421, 2010 WL 1838468, at *4 (D.N.J. May 05, 2010)(holding that because the plaintiff was of African-American descent, she was a “member of a protected class by virtue of her race and of her protected class by virtue of her race and of her ancestry”). However, mere invocation of the phrase “racial profiling” without more, is simply a legal conclusion, not a factual basis for a claim. The Court must disregard such legal conclusions and examine any facts alleged by Plaintiff that would form a plausible factual basis for that conclusion. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. The only relevant factual allegations made by Plaintiff are that he is black and he was stopped for an allegedly pretextual reason. Without more, this is an insufficient factual basis for the claim, because there is nothing in the pleadings to suggest that similarly-situated white drivers are not subject to improper investigative stops, or that this particular improper stop was a result of racial targeting instead of, say, the tinted windows or out-ofstate plates on the car. See, e.g., Pace Resources, Inc. v. Shrewsbury Tp., 808 F.2d 1023, 1026 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that conclusory allegations regarding similarlysituated individuals are insufficient to state a claim); Fisher v. Vassar College, 70 F.3d 1420, 1439 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that a plaintiff‟s “sense of being discriminated against” is insufficient to demonstrate discrimination).
EL V. WEHLING
For the purposes of the first prong of this inquiry, the plaintiff must “show that [he] is a member of a protected class and that [he] was treated differently from similarly situated individuals in an unprotected class.” Bradley v. U.S., 299 F.3d 197, 206 (3d Cir. 2002). The second prong of this inquiry was expressly examined by the Supreme Court in Iqbal, where the Court pointed out that the plaintiff asserting an equal protection claim “must plead [facts showing] that the defendant acted with a discriminatory purpose” to permit the court’s reasonable inference that the government-official defendant acted “for the purpose of discriminating on account of race.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77.
In the present case, Plaintiff fails to plead facts sufficient to satisfy either prong. First, Plaintiff has not alleged that he was treated differently from others similarly situated in an unprotected class. He contends that he was denied “the guarantees of the equal protection clause” that were afforded McArthur and Cruz “whom were of Hispanic or Latino ancestry and not dark skin pigmented” like Plaintiff. (5th Am. Compl. ¶ 569.) Plaintiff, however, does not explain how McArthur or Cruz were similarly situated to him or how they were treated differently. Second, other than bald and outrageous allegations that defendants purposefully prosecuted him to enact slave-like conditions, Plaintiff has not alleged facts showing discriminatory intent. Moreover, because Plaintiff refers to “equal protection” when describing a variety of conduct, including his allegedly false arrest and malicious prosecution, as well as the apparent confiscation of his Moorish identification documents, it is unclear what specific conduct and by what defendants allegedly resulted in a violation of Plaintiff’s Equal Protection rights. As such, Plaintiff’s Equal Protection claim will be dismissed.